Network Threat Hunter Training

Level 1

Thank you to our sponsors!

You'll need the class VMs

You only need one of these!
They are all the same, just tweaked for different platforms.

Hash is SHA256

VirtualBox
https://thunt-level1.s3.amazonaws.com/vbox-thunt-L1-202308.zip
5CF82AAEA859F9297CB33569BCFDC5023CAB87E78BD7605C82844D65BB41B899
Generic OVF
https://thunt-level1.s3.amazonaws.com/ovf-thunt-L1-202308.zip
D210F54CDC3E425E10C8FF66AE7F9B1EF0AC5924CE6A5543E1DDDC765252F992
VMware
https://thunt-level1.s3.amazonaws.com/vmware-thunt-L1-202308.zip
57E63852D10BC3C0D9F5B86E369FEFA555D8BF6B6ADA5D31A3E175F9B5109144

If you can't download the VM

▷ We have a new online option
▷ Public facing AC-Hunter server
▷ Read only access
▷ You **cannot**:
  ○ Add/delete databases
  ○ Add/delete safelists
  ○ Work at the command line
▷ Older version so experience is slightly different
▷ VM preferred but better than no option
▷ See the FAQ in the #resource channel for more info

VM versus online

VM

Hosts [1]	Network Name	Threat Score	
search for internal ip			🔍
192.168.99.51	Unknown Private	138.70	▼

Online

Hosts [6]	Network Name	Threat Score	
192.168.99.51	Unknown Private	128.76	▼
192.168.99.10	Unknown Private	0.00	▼
192.168.99.54	Unknown Private	0.00	▼
192.168.99.55	Unknown Private	0.00	▼

⚠ 1 POTENTIAL C2 OVER DNS CASES DETECTED →

Threat Intel Average Bytes	0 B	0.00
Too Many FQDNs Per Domain	2074	5.19
Unexpected Protocol on Well Known Port	0	0.00

5

VMWare/VirtualBox host access

▷ VMWare VM accessed via IP address
  ○ Originally set to 192.168.149.128
  ○ Example: ssh threat@192.168.149.128
  ○ Point host browser at https://192.168.149.128
▷ VirtualBox VM accessed via loopback
  ○ You must setup port forwarding & reboot!
  ○ Example: ssh threat@127.0.0.1:10022
  ○ Point host browser at https://127.0.0.1:10443

Logging in

▷ Using the class VM to do the labs
- Console & UI login info
  - Name: threat
  - Pass: hunting
- Same login info when using SSH
- Web browser interface to ACH CE
  - Name: threat@activecountermeasures.com
  - Pass: hunting2

▷ Q&A in Discord

VMWare Troubleshooting

▷ Guest will not start

▷ Error "VM using a hardware version that is not supported"

▷ Right click VM

○ Manage → Change hardware compatibility

○ Follow Wizard → Pick your VMWare product

https://www.augmastudio.com/2023/02/05/fix-virtual-machine-is-using-a-hardware-version-that-is-not-supported/

VMWare troubleshooting (2)

▷ Problem: On VMWare, I can't connect to the IP address in the slide

▷ Root cause: Sometimes VMware changes the host portion of the address

▷ Open terminal and run this command:

```
ip address | grep 192.168.149
```

VMWare generic problems

▷ VMWare loves to consume memory
▷ VMWare loves to consume vCPUs
▷ Feed the beast!
▷ This seems to fix a lot of problems

VirtualBox troubleshooting

▷ Can't connect to VM from host via loopback address

▷ Possible IP change when imported

▷ Open terminal and run this command:

```
ip address | grep 10.0.2
```

▷ Follow these instructions but using IP you saw when running the above command

https://www.activecountermeasures.com/port-forwarding-with-virtualbox/

Which ACH CE database to load?

New bash scripting class!

▷ Authored by the ONE… the ONLY…   Bill Stearns
▷ Getting comfortable with Linux command line
▷ Bash scripting
▷ Managing Linux systems with it
▷ Automating tasks
▷ Available on-demand

https://www.antisyphontraining.com/on-demand-courses/bash-scripting-for-server-administration-w-bill-stearns/

Classes I'm teaching

▷ **Intro to Threat Hunting**
- ○ Basics of network threat hunting
- ○ Feb 23rd (next Friday)
- ○ https://www.activecountermeasures.com/hunt-training/

▷ **Advanced Threat Hunting**
- ○ Mostly labs hunting command and control channels
- ○ March 14th & 15th
- ○ https://www.antisyphontraining.com/advanced-network-threat-hunting-w-chris-brenton/

▷ **Intro to Packet Decoding**
- ○ IP headers from a security perspective
- ○ April 23rd - 26th
- ○ https://www.antisyphontraining.com/live-courses-catalog/getting-started-in-packet-decoding-chris-brenton/

▷ **Next run of this class Friday April 19th**

</shameless_plugs>

Logistics

▷ 10 minute break at top of each hour
▷ 20 minute break at 3 hour point
▷ Use the Discord channel for discussion

○ #acm-webcast-chat channel

▷ The team is monitoring for your questions

Help with command line syntax

▷ We'll be working at the command line

▷ Some are nested commands

```
<command> | <command> | <command>
```

▷ I'll explain what's going on

▷ Try adding one command at a time to observe how it changes the output

https://www.explainshell.com/

Goals for this class

▷ Define "cyber threat hunting"
▷ Identify how to perform a threat hunt
▷ Define and identify connection persistency
▷ Learn how to investigate endpoints
▷ Hands on lab time running down real C2 channels used in the wild

What is threat hunting?

▷ Actively searching your environment for compromised systems

▷ Triggered by time or process, not by alerts

▷ Validate the integrity state of every system

    ○ Not just desktops and servers

    ○ Not just systems submitting logs to your SIEM

    ○ Not just the patterns you can hypothesise

▷ Output is a compromise assessment

Are we getting better at detection?

▷ Interesting Mandiant M-Trends nuggets
- External detection at 6 year high
- 55% in US, 74% in EMEA
- 67% of ransomware goes undetected

▷ Dwell time down to less than 30 days
- But ***drop shows no correlation to breach impact***
- Skewed by Ransomware at 5 days
- This questions if detection is actually improving

https://inthecloud.withgoogle.com/mandiant-m-trends-2023/download.html

Why breach data is important

▷ We've been checking our SIEMs
▷ We've been reviewing our host logs
▷ We've been searching for attack patterns we recognize
▷ But things are still not getting better
▷ It's time for a new approach
▷ This is where threat hunting comes in

The Purpose of Threat Hunting

Protection

Firewalls
Intrusion Detection
VPNs
Proxies
Anti-Virus
2-Factor
Authentication
Pentesting
Auditing

Dwell time between infiltration and detection

Threat Hunting should reduce the gap between protection failure and response as much as possible!

Response

Incident Handling
Log Review
Forensics
Public Relations
Cyber Insurance

Disclaimer – This is new territory

▷ Threat hunting has no industry standards

▷ You are getting in on the ground floor! ;-)

▷ We are still working out best processes

▷ This content is based on our experiences
  ○ Literally thousands of threat hunts
  ○ Scales through various environment sizes
  ○ Identifying new attacks that other processes miss
  ○ Thus this content will change over time

Start with the network

▷ The network is the great equalizer
  ○ You see everything, regardless of platform
  ○ Desktop, servers, IIoT, etc all reviewed the same
▷ You can hide processes but not packets
▷ Malware is usually controlled
  ○ Which makes targeting C2 extremely effective
  ○ Identify compromise when C2 "calls home"
  ○ Must be frequent enough to be useful
▷ Wide view so you can target from there

The threat hunting process

▷ Identify connection persistency
▷ Business need for connection?
  ○ Reputation check of external IP
▷ Abnormal protocol behaviour
▷ Investigation of internal IP
▷ Disposition
  ○ No threat detected = add to safelist
  ○ Compromised = Trigger incident handling

Start on the network

THEN pivot to the system logs

Don't cross "the passive/active line"

▷ All threat hunting activity should be undetectable to an adversary
▷ Passive in nature
  ○ Review packets
  ○ Review SIEM logs
▷ If active techniques are required, we must trigger incident response first
  ○ Example: Isolating the suspect host
  ○ Example: Running commands on suspect host

Where to Start

▷ Traffic to and from the Internet
  ○ Monitor internal interface of firewall
▷ Packet captures or Zeek data
▷ Analyze in large time blocks
  ○ More data = better fidelity
  ○ Minimum of 12 hours, 24 is ideal
▷ Analyze communications in pairs
  ○ Every outbound session passing the firewall
  ○ Ignore internal to internal (high false positive)

Typical deployment

Does targeting C2 have blind spots?

▷ Attackers motivated by gain
- Information
- Control of resources

▷ Sometimes "gain" does not require C2
- Just looking to destroy the target
- Equivalent to dropping a cyber bomb
- We are talking nation state at this level

▷ NotPetya
- Worm with no C2 designed to seek and destroy

Start by checking persistency

- ▷ Focus on persistent connections
  - ○ Internal system in constantly initiating connections with an outside "system"
  - ○ Long connections
  - ○ Beacons
- ▷ Persistent connections should have an identifiable business need
  - ○ Checking the time
  - ○ Checking for patches

Long connections

▷ You are looking for:

▷ Total time for each connection
  ○ Which ones have gone on the longest?

▷ Cumulative time for all pair connections
  ○ Total amount of time the pair has been in contact

▷ Can be useful to ignore ports or protocols
  ○ C2 can change channels

Long connection example

What is a beacon?

▷ Repetitive connection establishment between two IP addresses
  ○ Easiest to detect
▷ Repetitive connection establishment between internal IP and FQDN
  ○ Target can be spread across multiple IP's
    ■ Usually a CDN provider
  ○ Target IPs also destination for legitimate traffic
  ○ Far more difficult to detect

Tell my minion to steal all local documents!

Command & Control Server
(C&C)

Have anything for me to do?
<wait 600 seconds>
Have anything for me to do?
<repeat>

Regular C2

Tell my minion to steal all local documents!

Command & Control Server (C2)

CDN Network

foo.evil.com resolves to multiple IP's

Have anything for me to do? <wait 600 seconds>

C2 through CDN

39

Beacon detection based on timing

▷ May follow an exact time interval
- ○ Technique is less common today
- ○ Detectable by k-means
- ○ Potential false positives

▷ May introduce "jitter"
- ○ Vary connection sleep delta
- ○ Avoids k-means detection
- ○ False positives are extremely rare

▷ Short enough delta for terminal activities

Connection quantity VS time

Each bar represents the number of times the source
connected to the destination during that one hour time block

Connect time deltas with no jitter

How often a specific time delta was observed

Connection time deltas with jitter

Cobalt Strike will typically
produce a bell curve

Pretty well randomized but
still a small dwell time "window"

Detection based on session size

▷ Focuses on detection of the heartbeat
  ○ Useful for C2 over social media
▷ Variations from the heartbeat indicate activation of C2 channel
▷ Session size can help reveal info regarding commands being issued
▷ Possible to randomly pad but this is extremely rare

Session size analysis

Heartbeat

Activation

Safelisting

▷ Not all persistence is "evil"

▷ Could be part of normal operations
  ○ Keep computer time in sync
  ○ Checking for patches
  ○ Checking on an external service

▷ When business need can be identified, we should safelist the connection
  ○ Keep it out of future hunts
  ○ Don't make safelists any broader than necessary

Identifying business need

- Do you recognize the domain?
  - microsoft.com
  - windows.com
  - ntp.org
- Can you relate the services to a specific department?
- The purchasing group can be helpful
  - Find the company behind the domain
  - Are we purchasing services from them?

Check destination IP address

▷ Start simple
- ○ Who manages ASN?
- ○ Geolocation info?
- ○ IP delegation
- ○ PTR records

▷ Do you recognize the target organization?
- ○ Business partner or field office
- ○ Current vendor (active status)

▷ Other internal IP's connecting?

Some helpful links

```
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/<IP Address>
https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/<IP Address>
https://search.censys.io/hosts/<IP Address>
https://dns.google/query?name=<IP Address>
https://www.google.com/search?q=<IP Address>
https://www.onyphe.io/search/?query=<IP Address>
https://securitytrails.com/list/ip/<IP Address>
https://www.shodan.io/host/<IP Address>
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/<IP Address>/relations
```

C2 Detection Techniques
Part 2

What next?

▷ You've identified connection persistence

▷ You can't identify a business need

▷ Next steps
  ○ Protocol analysis
  ○ Reputation check of external target
  ○ Investigate internal IP address

Unexpected app or port usage

▷ There should be a business need for all outbound protocols

▷ Research non-standard or unknown ports
  ○ TCP/5222 (Chrome remote desktop)
  ○ TCP/5800 & 590X (VNC)
  ○ TCP/502 (Modbus)

▷ TeamViewer!

Unknown app on standard port

▷ **C2 wants to tunnel out of environment**
- ○ Pick a port likely to be permitted outbound
- ○ Does not always worry about protocol compliance

▷ **Check standard ports for unexpected apps**
- ○ Indication of tunneling
- ○ TCP/80 and TCP/443 most common

▷ **Different than app on non-standard port**
- ○ This is sometimes done as "a feature"
- ○ Example: SSH listening on TCP/2222

Zeek decodes many apps

▷ Detect over 55 applications
  ○ HTTP, DNS, SIP, MYSQL, RDP, NTLM, etc. etc.
▷ Fairly easy to add new ones
  ○ Example: HL7 if you are in healthcare
▷ Checks all analyzers for each port
▷ Does not assume WKP = application

Zeek example

```
thunt@thunt-labs:~/lab1$ cat conn.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p
 proto service orig_ip_bytes resp_ip_bytes | column -t | head
192.168.99.51              104.248.234.238    80     tcp    http    689         403
192.168.99.51              23.223.200.136     80     tcp    -       80          40
192.168.99.51              104.248.234.238    80     tcp    http    729         443
192.168.99.52              224.0.0.251        5353   udp    dns     344         0
fe80::d048:42e0:8448:187c  ff02::fb           5353   udp    dns     424         0
fe80::d048:42e0:8448:187c  ff02::1:3          5355   udp    dns     81          0
192.168.99.52              224.0.0.252        5355   udp    dns     61          0
fe80::d048:42e0:8448:187c  ff02::1:3          5355   udp    dns     81          0
192.168.99.52              224.0.0.252        5355   udp    dns     61          0
192.168.99.51              104.248.234.238    80     tcp    http    689         403
thunt@thunt-labs:~/lab1$
```

AC-Hunter example

Unexpected protocol use

▷ Attackers may bend but not break rules
▷ This can result in:
  ○ Full protocol compliance
  ○ Abnormal behaviour
▷ Need to understand "normal"
  ○ For the protocol
  ○ For your environment

C2 over DNS

authoritative server
for evil.com

Tell my minion to steal all
local documents!

Command &
Control Server (C2)

What's the TXT record for
20202020202020202020203133830.evil.com

Have anything for me to do?

Example: Too many FQDNs

▷ How many FQDNs do domains expose?
  ○ Most is < 10
  ○ Recognizable Internet based vendors 200 - 600
    ■ Microsoft
    ■ Akamai
    ■ Google
    ■ Amazon
▷ Greater than 1,000 is suspicious
▷ Could be an indication of C2 traffic

Detecting C2 over DNS

Bonus checks on DNS

▷ Check domains with a lot of FQDNs
▷ Get a list of the IPs returned
▷ Compare against traffic patterns
  ○ Are internal hosts visiting this domain?
  ○ Is it just your name servers?
▷ Unique trait of C2 over DNS
  ○ Lots or FQDN queries
  ○ But no one ever connects to these systems

Normal DNS query patten

Things that make you go "hummm"

Look for odd HTTP user agents

```
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~/lab1$ cat http.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h user_agent
 | grep 10.0.2.15 | sort | uniq | cut -f 3 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
     15 Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0
     12 Microsoft-WNS/10.0
      1 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.2) Java/1.5.0_08
ritabeakerlab@ritabeakerlab:~/lab1$
```

10.0.2.15 identifies itself as:

Windows 10 when speaking to 27 different IP's on the Internet
Windows XP when speaking to one specific IP on the Internet

Unique SSL Client Hello: Zeek + JA3

SSL/TLS Hash	Seen	Requests	Sources
5e573c9c9f8ba720ef9b18e9fce2e2f7	1	clientservices.googleapis.com	10.55.182.100
bc6c386f480ee97b9d9e52d472b772d8	2	clients4.google.com, 556-emw-319.mktoresp.com	10.55.182.100
f3405aa9ca597089a55cf8c62754de84	2	builds.cdn.getgo.com	10.55.182.100
28a2c9bd18a11de089ef85a160da29e4	2	mediaredirect.microsoft.com	10.55.100.105, 10.55.182.100
08bf94d7f3200a537b5e3b76b06e02a2	4	files01.netgate.com	192.168.88.2

Internal system

▷ Info available varies greatly between orgs
▷ Inventory management systems
▷ Security tools like Carbon Black
▷ OS projects like BeaKer
▷ Internal security scans
▷ DHCP logs
▷ Login events
▷ Passive fingerprinting

Leverage internal host logging

▷ Network shows suspicious traffic patterns
▷ Use this data to pivot to host logs
▷ Filter your logs based on:
  ○ Suspect internal host
  ○ Timeframe being analyzed
▷ Anything stand out as unique or odd?

Sysmon Event ID Type 3's

Map outbound connections to the applications that created them.

Sysmon Type 3 + BeaKer

But I have no system logs!

▷ Good time to start collecting them
▷ Full packet captures from system
▷ Apply additional network tools to collect more data
▷ Just remember, no detectable actions until we trigger incident response mode!

What next?

▷ Disposition session
  - "I think it's safe" = add to safelist
  - "I think we've detected a compromise" = Incident response mode

▷ Remember to leave no footprints
  - All actions undetectable to potential adversaries
  - Passive activities only

▷ Incident response may include active tasks

Network Threat Hunting Tools

capinfos

▷ Print summary info regarding pcaps
▷ For a decent hunt you want 12+ hours
▷ 86,400 seconds = 24 hours

```
cbrenton@guess:~/c2$ capinfos -aeu evilosx_24hr.pcap
File name:              evilosx_24hr.pcap
Capture duration:      86291.558021 seconds
First packet time:     2021-02-17 03:40:26.100491
Last packet time:      2021-02-18 03:38:37.658512
cbrenton@guess:~/c2$
```

tcpdump

▷ ## What's it good for?
  - ○ Lightweight packet capturing tool
  - ○ Cross platform support (windump on Windows)

▷ ## When to use it
  - ○ Audit trail of all traffic
  - ○ Can also filter to see only specific traffic
  - ○ Can be fully automated

▷ ## Where to get it

https://www.tcpdump.org/

tcpdump example

▷ Debian/Ubuntu
  ○ Place the following in /etc/rc.local
▷ Red Hat/CentOS, Fedora
  ○ Place the following in /etc/rc.d/rc.local
▷ Grabs all traffic and rotates every 60 min
  ○ Date/time stamped and compressed

```
#Place _above_ any "exit" line
mkdir -p /opt/pcaps
screen -S capture -t capture -d -m bash -c "tcpdump -ieth0 -G
3600 -w '/opt/pcaps/`hostname -s`.%Y%m%d%H%M%S.pcap' -z bzip2"
```

tshark

▷ What's it good for?
- ○ Extracting interesting fields from packet captures
- ○ Multiple passes to focus on different attributes
- ○ Combine with text manipulation tools
- ○ Can be automated

▷ When to use it
- ○ Both major and minor attributes

▷ Where to get it

https://www.wireshark.org/

Tshark example - DNS queries

```
$ tshark -r thunt-lab.pcapng -T fields -e dns.qry.name
udp.port==53 | head -10

6dde0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
6dde0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
0b320175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
0b320175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
344b0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
344b0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
0f370175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
0f370175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
251e0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
251e0175375169c68f.dnsc.r-1x.com
```

Tshark example - user agents

```
$ tshark -r sample.pcap -T fields -e http.user_agent tcp.
dstport==80 | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | head -10
      2 Microsoft Office/16.0
      2 Valve/Steam HTTP Client 1.0 (client;windows;10;1551832902)
      3 Valve/Steam HTTP Client 1.0
     11 Microsoft BITS/7.5
     11 Windows-Update-Agent
     12 Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.1
    104 PCU
```

Wireshark

▷ What's it good for?
  - Packet analysis with guardrails
  - Stream level summaries

▷ When to use it
  - As part of a manual analysis
  - When steps cannot be automated

▷ Where to get it

https://www.wireshark.org/

Useful when I have a target

Zeek

- ▷ Network recorder
- ▷ What's it good for?
  - ○ Near real time analysis (1+ hour latency)
  - ○ More storage friendly than pcaps
- ▷ When to use it
  - ○ When you need to scale
  - ○ When you know what attributes to review
- ▷ Where to get it

https://www.zeek.org/
sudo apt -y install zeek

Zeek example - cert check

```
$ cat ssl* | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p
validation_status | grep 'self signed' | sort | uniq
122.228.10.51   192.168.88.2    9943    self signed certificate in
certificate chain
24.111.1.134    192.168.88.2    9943    self signed certificate in
certificate chain
71.6.167.142    192.168.88.2    9943    self signed certificate in
certificate chain
```

-d for human readable times

▷ Zeek-cut prints epoch time by default
▷ "-d" converts to human readable

```
cbrenton@cbrenton-beacon-src-test:~/foo$ cat conn.01\:00\:00-02\
:00\:00.log | zeek-cut ts id.orig_h | head -8
1645578000.318671        167.172.154.151
1645578000.318784        167.172.154.151
1645578000.318841        167.172.154.151
1645578000.334906        167.172.154.151
1645578000.334948        167.172.154.151
1645578000.334977        167.172.154.151
1645578001.228742        167.172.154.151
1645578001.360749        167.172.154.151
cbrenton@cbrenton-beacon-src-test:~/foo$ cat conn.01\:00\:00-02\
:00\:00.log | zeek-cut -d ts id.orig_h | head -8
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:00+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:01+0000         167.172.154.151
2022-02-23T01:00:01+0000         167.172.154.151
cbrenton@cbrenton-beacon-src-test:~/foo$
```

zcutter.py

▷ zeek-cut limited to CSV format

▷ What if you use JSON?

▷ zcutter.py to the rescue!

▷ Like zeek-cut, but supports CSV & JSON

▷ Will also process multiple log files simultaneously

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/activecm/zcutter/main/zcutter.py

Passer

TC,172.1.199.23,TCP_43,open,
TC,172.16.199.23,TCP_55443,open,
UC,172.16.199.23,UDP_626,open,serialnumberd/clientscanner likely nmap scan Warnings:scan
UC,172.16.199.23,UDP_1194,open,openvpn/client Warnings:tunnel
UC,172.16.199.23,UDP_3386,open,udp3386/client
UC,172.16.199.23,UDP_5632,open,pcanywherestat/clientscanner Warnings:scan
UC,172.16.199.23,UDP_64738,open,shodan_host/clientscanner abcdefgh Unlisted host Warnings:scan
DN,2001:db8:1001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0015,AAAA,ns3.markmonitor.com.,
DN,fe80:0000:0000:0000:189f:545b:7d4c:eeb8,PTR,Apple TV._device-info._tcp.local.,model=J105aA

Smudge

```
.-[ 192.168.99.51/52864 -> 104.248.234.238/80 ]-

|

| client = 192.168.99.51/52864

| os = Windows 7

| certainty = 40%

| dist = 0

| raw_sig = 4:128:0:1460:65535:8:M1460,N,W8,N,N,S:df,id+,ack-,uptr+:0

|

`____
```

Can run it alone or integrated with Passer

ngrep

▷ Pattern match on passing packets

▷ Like "grep" for network traffic

▷ Useful for quick checks

○ NIDS with signature better choice for long term

▷ Useful switches

○ "-q" = Don't print "#" for non-matches

○ "-I" = Read a pcap file

https://github.com/jpr5/ngrep
sudo apt install ngrep

ngrep example

```
cbrenton@cbrenton-lab-testing:~/pcaps$ ngrep -q -I odd.pcap Admin | head -15
input: odd.pcap
match: Admin

T 148.78.247.10:26922 -> 12.33.247.4:80 [AP]
  GET /cfide/Administrator/startstop.html HTTP/1.0..Host: 12.33.247.4..User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 [en] (Win
  95; U)..Referer: http://12.33.247.4/..X-Forwarded-For: 148.64.147.168..Cache-Control: max-stale=0..Pra
  gma: no-cache......Cv

T 12.33.247.4:80 -> 148.78.247.10:26922 [AP]
  HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found..Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 00:34:58 GMT..Server: Apache..Connection: close..Conten
  t-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1....<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">.<HTML><HEA
  D>.<TITLE>404 Not Found</TITLE>.</HEAD><BODY>.<H1>Not Found</H1>.The requested URL /cfide/Administrato
  r/startstop.html was not found on this server.<P>.</BODY></HTML>.....

T 12.33.247.4:80 -> 148.78.247.10:26922 [AFP]
cbrenton@cbrenton-lab-testing:~/pcaps$ _
```

RITA

▷ What's it good for?
- ○ Beacon & long conn at scale
- ○ Some secondary attributes

▷ When to use it
- ○ Can better organize Zeek data
- ○ Good when you are comfortable scripting
- ○ Will scale but can be time consuming

▷ Where to get it

https://github.com/activecm/rita

RITA example - beacons

```
cbrenton@cb-lab:~/lab1$ rita show-beacons lab1 | head
Score,Source IP,Destination IP,Connections,Avg. Bytes,Intvl Range,Size Range,Top
Intvl,Top Size,Top Intvl Count,Top Size Count,Intvl Skew,Size Skew,Intvl Dispersi
on,Size Dispersion,Total Bytes
1,10.55.100.111,165.227.216.194,20054,92,29,52,1,52,7774,20053,0,0,0,0,1845020
0.838,10.55.200.10,205.251.194.64,210,308,29398,4,300,70,109,205,0,0,0,0,64850
0.835,10.55.200.11,205.251.197.77,69,308,1197,4,300,70,38,68,0,0,0,0,21313
0.834,10.55.100.111,34.239.169.214,34,1259,5,14388,1,156,15,30,0,0,0,0,42831
0.834,192.168.88.2,13.107.5.2,27,198,2,33,12601,73,4,15,0,0,0,0,5370
0.833,10.55.100.107,23.52.161.212,24,5404,43235,52,1800,505,19,21,0,0,0,0,129717
0.833,10.55.100.107,23.52.162.184,24,2397,43356,52,1800,467,18,18,0,0,0,0,57540
0.833,10.55.100.111,23.52.161.212,27,5379,37752,92,1800,505,17,20,0,0,0,0,145256
0.833,10.55.100.109,23.52.161.212,26,5417,39646,52,1800,505,21,20,0,0,0,0,140848
cbrenton@cb-lab:~/lab1$ _
```

Scale is 0 - 1 with 1.0 being a perfect beacon score

RITA can also check

▷ Beacons based on HTTP/host or TLS/SNI

▷ Beacons based on FQDN

▷ Beacons through SOCKS server

▷ Long connections

▷ Still open (not yet logged) connections

▷ C2 over DNS

▷ Matches against your threat intel list

AC-Hunter (Community & Enterprise)

Score ranking on the left, breakdown of scores on the right

Beacon screen

93

Beacon analysis – 24 hour graph

Multiple hours showing the same number of connections

Time interval count

Frequency of a specific time delta between connections
Varied timing like this indicates jitter

View 2 = Session size analysis

Target investigation

DST	68.183.138.51	— ▽
asn	14061	
org	DIGITALOCEAN-AS...	
range	68.183.0.0/16	
city	North Bergen, N...	
country	United States	
location	40.793N, -74.02...	
queried fqdn	[no results]	
historic fqdn	[no results]	
comm	80:tcp:http, 80...	

Click IP to open Web investigation options

Click to add to safelist

Generic location info

What did the user query via DNS before connecting to this IP address?

Protocol data

Beacon Web analysis

Default display

Mouse over first HTTP server's IP address
C2 connecting to multiple IPs via CDN

ACH - Long connections

ACH - Threat intel

Threat Intel Connections [Outgoing]	1	10.00
Threat Intel Connections [Incoming]	0	0.00
Threat Intel Average Bytes	199.58 B	0.00

- Score 10 points when a match is identified
- Monitor bytes from internal to external
- If > 5 MB, start adding in more points
- If >= 25 MB, increase score by 100 points

ACH - Cyber deception

Use canary tokens to create tripwires within your environment

ACH - Deep dive

Install process

```
threat@ACH:~/Downloads/achunter$ ./install_acm.sh

================ Selecting Installation Components ================
Do you wish to install AC-Hunter (Y/N)? y
What is the hostname or IP address of the system on which to install AC-Hunter (enter     127.0.0
.1    if you wish to install it on this system)
127.0.0.1
Do you wish to install Zeek (Y/N)? y
What is the hostname or IP address of the system on which to install Zeek (enter     127.0.0.1
 if you wish to install it on this system)
127.0.0.1
Do you wish to install Active-Flow (Y/N)? n
Do you wish to install Beaker (Y/N)? _
```

Options:
Install from binary (above) - More time, smaller download, most flexibility
Download official VM - Pretty much ready to go with minor tweaking, larger download
VM for this class - Labs to guide learning, largest download

CE Versus Enterprise

Datamash

▷ What's it good for?
- ○ Similar to the R-base tools, but more extensive
- ○ Performing simple calculation on data

▷ When to use it
- ○ Performing calculations on multiple lines
- ○ Statistical analysis

▷ Where to get it

https://www.gnu.org/software/datamash/
sudo apt install datamash

Datamash

▷ Used for processing raw data at the command line

▷ Great for sifting through tabulated data
   ○ Like Zeek logs

▷ Can perform statistical analysis
   ○ Min, max, mean, etc.
   ○ Can add together values

Datamash example

```
cbrenton@cbrenton-lab-testing:~/lab3$ cat conn.log | zeek-cut
id.orig_h id.resp_h duration | sort -k3 -rn | head -5
192.168.1.105    143.166.11.10    328.754946
192.168.1.104    63.245.221.11    41.884228    ←
192.168.1.104    63.245.221.11    31.428539    ←
192.168.1.105    143.166.11.10    27.606923
192.168.1.102    192.168.1.1      4.190865
```

Duplicate IPs

```
cbrenton@cbrenton-lab-testing:~/lab3$ cat conn.log | zeek-cut
id.orig_h id.resp_h duration | grep -v -e '^$' | grep -v '-' | sort |
datamash -g 1,2 sum 3| sort -k3 -rn | head -5
192.168.1.105    143.166.11.10    356.361869
192.168.1.104    63.245.221.11    73.312767
192.168.1.102    192.168.1.1      5.464553
192.168.1.103    192.168.1.1      4.956918
192.168.1.105    192.168.1.1      1.99374
```

Beacon/Threat Simulator

▷ Permits you to test your C2 detection setup

▷ Target any TCP or UDP port

▷ Can jitter timing

▷ Can jitter payload size

▷ Not designed to exfiltrate data!

```
beacon-simulator.sh <target IP> 80 300 10 tcp 5000
```

Connect to TCP/80 on target IP every 300 seconds, +/-10 seconds, vary payload between 0-5,000 bytes

https://github.com/activecm/threat-tools

What if I need specific app data?

```
#beacon-test
while :
do
        curl -A 'Modzilla/0.0001 (Atari 7800)' $1 >/dev/null 2>&1
        sleep $(shuf -i200-350 -n1)
done
```

Then run this command with screen:

```
screen -S c2 -d -m /bin/beacon-test <Target IP or FQDN>
```

Create your own scripts!

```
cbrenton@cb-lab:~/lab1$ cat /bin/fq
echo 'DNS info'
cat dns.* | zeek-cut answers query | sort | uniq | grep -Fw $1
echo 'HTTP info'
cat http.* | zeek-cut id.resp_h host user_agent | sort | uniq | grep -Fw $1
echo 'TLS info'
cat ssl.* | zeek-cut id.resp_h server name validation_status | sort | uniq | grep -Fw $1
cbrenton@cb-lab:~/lab1$ fq 69.172.216.56
DNS info
anycast.fw.adsafeprotected.com,69.172.216.56     fw.adsafeprotected.com
HTTP info
TLS info
69.172.216.56   fw.adsafeprotected.com   ok
cbrenton@cb-lab:~/lab1$
```

Example script you can create to make life easier
"fq" check dns.log, http.log and ssl.log **in the local directory**
Returns info on specified IP address of FQDN
Use "zcat" if logs are in compressed format

110

What We Will Cover

▷ This section is mostly hands on labs

▷ Implement what you have learned

▷ Two formats:

- Guided walkthrough - Just follow along
- Labs - Try to solve the problem on your own
- Labs have a "hints" page if you get stuck

▷ Walkthroughs stress familiarization

▷ Labs used to cement your knowledge

- Hints provided if needed

Reminder

▷ Class VM
  ○ SSH login - threat
  ○ SSH pass - hunting
  ○ Web login - threat@activecountermeasures.com
  ○ Web pass - hunting2

Guided tour - Finding the lab files

```
threat@ACH:~$ pwd
/home/threat
threat@ACH:~$ ls
Desktop      Downloads  Music      Public    Templates
Documents    labs       Pictures   snap      Videos
threat@ACH:~$ cd labs
threat@ACH:~/labs$ ls
lab1  lab2  lab3
threat@ACH:~/labs$ cd lab1
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ ls
capture_loss.log   http.log              packet_filter.log
certs-remote.pem   known_hosts.log       software.log
conn.log           known_services.log    ssl.log
dhcp.log           loaded_scripts.log    stats.log
dns.log            notice.log            x509.log
files.log          ntp.log
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$
```

Guided tour - Login to ACH

Working from the VM desktop

Working remote from host with VirtualBox

Working remote from host with VMWare

Guided tour - First login

Database Selection

NAME	TIMESTAMP RANGE	DELETE
○ localhost-rolling	07/25/23 14:20 -- 07/26/23 14:20	✕
○ proxy	01/04/23 13:48 -- 01/05/23 13:48	✕
○ winlab-agent	10/01/20 16:06 -- 10/02/20 14:36	✕
○ open-connections	01/30/18 13:14 -- 01/31/18 13:13	✕
○ gcat	02/16/18 01:59 -- 02/17/18 01:59	✕
◉ dnscat2-ja3	01/30/18 13:14 -- 01/31/18 13:13	✕

Database Removal

| Delete All	By Age

Confirm

Guided tour - What you should see

Guided tour - What if I see this?

Change VM View to full screen

Zoom out Chrome

Changing databases

Let's add a safelist entry

▷ Used when legit business need is identified

▷ Keep the entry from showing up in hunts

▷ Applied across all databases

▷ Does not delete data!

  ○ Hides from view

  ○ Hides from scoring

▷ Remove entry and data returns

Guided walkthrough - safelisting

Click "beacons web" on bottom of the dashboard

Select second IP in list

Guided walkthrough - Analyze

Traffic to skype.com with a legitimate digital certificate
Assume Skype is an approved business app

Guided walkthrough - Safelist

Click the filter icon to add this entry to the safelist

Guided walkthrough - Safelist

When no FQDN info, implement based on IP
Never do this by IP when target is a CDN!!!

Guided walkthrough - Entry removed

Entry is removed. Next on the list is displayed.

Guided walkthrough - Manage safelists

Return to the dashboard

Click the gear for Settings

Select "safelist"

Click "View/Edit" button

Guided walkthrough – View safelists

VIEW / EDIT GLOBAL SAFELIST

- Global Safelist Entries

Search	type	scope
Ex. 10.10.10.10	---	---

name ↑	type	scope	comment	actions
*.edge.skype.com	domain_pattern		Skype traffic. Created by cbrenton on 20230223	⌄ ✕

1/1

AC-Hunter CE supports 50 safelist entries

Guided walkthrough - Investigation

Highlight first entry

Click the first entry (Beacon score)

Hosts [14]	Network Name	Threat Score	
192.168.88.2	Unknown Private	219.91	▼
10.55.100.111	Unknown Private	140.47	▼
10.55.100.105	Unknown Private	132.90	▼
10.55.100.100	Unknown Private	128.45	▼
10.55.100.107	Unknown Private	128.45	▼
10.55.100.110	Unknown Private	127.43	▼
10.55.100.109	Unknown Private	124.55	▼

search for internal ip

Threat Activity	Value	Points
Beacon Score [strongest signal seen]	99.90%	99.90
Beacon Web Score [strongest signal seen]	0.00%	0.00
Beacon Proxy Score [strongest signal seen]	0.00%	0.00
Longest Connection	00:00:09	0.00
Threat Intel Connections [Outgoing]	1	10.00
Threat Intel Connections [Incoming]	0	0.00
Threat Intel Average Bytes	199.58 B	0.00
Unexpected Protocol on Well Known Port	0	0.00
Triggered Event on Canary Token	2	100.00
Rare Client Signature Count	1	10.00
Total		219.91

Guided walkthrough - Investigation

Clicking IP or FQDN opens investigation menu

Provide more data on subject

Start by clicking "deep dive"

# Guided walkthrough - deep dive

Only internal host speaking to this IP

Guided walkthrough - more data

Click internal IP

Summary of comms shown

Click "P" to pivot

Guided walkthrough - pivot

Pivot changes view to other IP address

If you find a C2 server, use this to see if others are talking to it as well.

Guided walkthrough - Other options

Navigate back

Select VirusTotal

Guided walkthrough - Investigation

216.229.4.69

1 / 88

? Community Score

(!) 1 security vendor flagged this IP address as malicious

216.229.4.69 (216.229.0.0/21)

AS 7806 (ASN7806)

DETECTION   DETAILS   RELATIONS   COMMUNITY 1

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections.

Passive DNS Replication (200) (i)

Date resolved	Detections	Resolver	Domain
2023-02-13	0 / 87	VirusTotal	time.if.iqiyi.com
2022-12-09	0 / 87	Georgia Institute of Technology	2.almalinux.pool.ntp.org
2022-12-03	0 / 87	Georgia Institute of Technology	0.homewizard.pool.ntp.org
2022-12-01	0 / 87	Georgia Institute of Technology	1.ipfire.pool.ntp.org
2022-11-21	0 / 88	VirusTotal	3.siemens.pool.ntp.org
2022-11-19	0 / 88	Georgia Institute of Technology	2.echo360.pool.ntp.org

New tab opens

Passes IP/FQDN to external site for additional info

134

Guided walkthrough - Long conns

Return to dashboard

Open long connections module

Guided walkthrough - screen info

If you don't see data, check Search and Threshold. May need to clear values.

Note screen layout is similar.

Guided walkthrough - data import

▷ Follow along to import the data

▷ We have Zeek logs we want to analyze

▷ Let's get them imported in to ACH CE

▷ We'll use RITA to do the import
  ○ Yes, RITA is "under the hood"

Go to the lab1 directory

Navigate to the "lab1" directory

```
threat@ACH:~$ cd labs
threat@ACH:~/labs$ cd lab1
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ pwd
/home/threat/labs/lab1
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ ls
capture_loss.log    http.log              packet_filter.log
certs-remote.pem    known_hosts.log       software.log
conn.log            known_services.log    ssl.log
dhcp.log            loaded_scripts.log    stats.log
dns.log             notice.log            x509.log
files.log           ntp.log
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ _
```

Importing Zeek logs into ACH

```
rita import <path to zeek logs> <database name>
```

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ rita import *.log lab1
[sudo] password for threat:
Creating achunter_api_run ... done

        [+] Importing [/home/threat/labs/lab1/capture_loss.log
/home/threat/labs/lab1/conn.log /home/threat/labs/lab1/dhcp.log
```

…

```
        [-] Indexing log entries ...
        [-] Updating metadatabase ...
        [-] Done!

threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$
```

DB should now appear in ACH CE

Lab1

▷ Go to the beacon web module

▷ Six entries scored above 80

▷ Evaluate each of the 6
  ○ Spend about 60 sec max on each
  ○ Which entries look suspicious?
  ○ Which entries can be safelisted?
  ○ Make a list of each

▷ Stick with the UI
  ○ We'll dig into the logs in a later lab

RESULTS

>50%   Score [▼]
Score   Sort

search by ip or fqdn

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

192.168.99.51

Hints

▷ Go for the easiest ones first
▷ If you can decide in less than a minute, make a note and move to the next one
▷ Circle back to the hard ones after you've gone through everything

Lab1 - Answers

Lab1 answers - First entry

▷ Refer to previous slide

▷ Very high beacon score

▷ Lots of conns over 24 hours (3,011)

▷ Histogram is pretty flat

▷ User agent identifies as Windows 7

   ○ Could be legit but seems kind of old

▷ No host string

   ○ Should identify FQDN of Web server

▷ Well come back to this one

Lab1 answers - Second entry

▷ MS delivery optimization host
▷ Used in Windows for patching
▷ Digital cert looks legit
▷ We could safelist this one

DST	array506.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com
tls servers	52.184.216.246
tls ports used	443
subjects	CN=*.prod.do.ds...
invalid certificate	yes
comm	443:tcp:ssl

Lab1 answers - 3rd & 4th entry

Windows tile services
This can be safelisted

Windows patching
Note this is similar to 2nd entry
"array509" versus "array506"
We can safelist both with a wildcard

Lab1 answers - 5th & 6th entry

DST — ctldl.windowsupdate.com

http servers	23.40.55.176, 8...
http ports used	80
http methods	GET
useragents	Microsoft-Crypt...
comm	80:tcp:http

DST — array503.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com

tls servers	52.179.219.14
tls ports used	443
subjects	CN=*.prod.do.ds...
invalid certificate	yes
comm	443:tcp:ssl

Both are Windows patching
Note another "array"

Next lab - Create safelist entries

▷ **First entry looks suspicious**
- ○ We will cycle back to it

▷ **The rest look legit**
- ○ Windows patching
- ○ Windows desktop tile services

▷ **Let's safelist these last 5 entries**

▷ **Try this on your own**

Lab hints

▷ Consolidate with wildcards

▷ You only need 3 safelist entries to cover all five targets

▷ Safelisting by FQDN is preferred
  ○ Updates when IP changes
  ○ Track through CDNs as required

Creating a safelist entry

Safelist settings

Any internal system

Wildcard match

Wildcard covers all "array" entries

Don't forget Comment

Did you notice?

▷ The 1 safelist removed 3 entries
▷ All were "array" entries
▷ The wildcard covered all 3
▷ Create the last two needed

RESULTS

>50% ▼   Score [▼]   ▼
Score   Sort

search by ip or fqdn   🔍

▫ **192.168.99.51**

▫ **192.168.99.51**

▫ **192.168.99.51**

▫ **192.168.99.51**

|< <   1 / 1   > >|

View safelists when complete

VIEW / EDIT GLOBAL SAFELIST

- Global Safelist Entries

Search
Ex. 10.10.10.10

type
---

scope
---

name ↑	type	scope	comment	actions
*.edge.skype.com	domain_pattern		Skype traffic. Created by cbrenton on 20230223	⌄ ✕
*.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com	domain_pattern		Windows patching via delivery optimization. cbrenton 202302027	⌄ ✕
ctldl.windowsupdate.com	domain_literal		Windows checking for patches	⌄ ✕
tile-service.weather.microsoft.com	domain_literal		Windows tile services	⌄ ✕

|< < 1 / 1 > >|

Completed safelist entries

152

Next lab!

▷ Still working with "lab1" dataset

▷ Go to "long connections module"

▷ Evaluate connections lasting > 5 hours

▷ Spend 60 seconds max on each

▷ Identify

   ○ Which look suspect and need further investigation?

   ○ Which can be safelisted?

Hints

▷ Only two entries to work with

▷ Don't forget clicking an IP brings up the investigation menu

▷ What is known about the external IP?

▷ Could this host serve a legitimate business purpose?

Answers – Some basic info

▷ NO FQDN entry identified for either IP

▷ "comm" does not identify protocol

▷ ACH stores this data for 24 hours

○ FQDN queried via DNS

○ App protocol during initial negotiation

▷ After 24 hours, both labeled as unknown

▷ We would need to go back through the Zeek data to when the conn started

Lab answers - 1st IP

167.71.97.235

0 / 88

? Community Score ✕ ✓

ⓘ No security vendor flagged this IP address as malicious

167.71.97.235 (167.71.0.0/16)
AS 14061 (DIGITALOCEAN-ASN)

US

DETECTION   DETAILS   **RELATIONS**   COMMUNITY

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections.

Passive DNS Replication (2) ⓘ

Date resolved	Detections	Resolver	Domain
2022-11-16	0 / 87	VirusTotal	pisensordca63202755c.aihhosted.com
2020-09-23	0 / 89	VirusTotal	demo1.aihhosted.com

Files Referring (1) ⓘ

Scanned	Detections	Type	Name
2021-10-21	0 / 57	unknown	7May2021_export_bookmark.html

Historical Whois Lookups (3) ⓘ

	Last Updated	Organization	Email
+	2021-10-21		
+	2021-08-19		
+	2020-06-03	DigitalOcean, LLC	abuse@digitalocean.com

Graph Summary ⓘ

What if I visit this IP or domain?

Connect from a non-work related IP

Target produces an "AC-Hunter" login
www.aihhosted.com redirects to Active Countermeasures
Can we identify a business need with this tool or domain?

Answers - 2nd IP

Looks like Windows notification services

Standard Windows Service

Answers – Sanity check

▷ 1 suspect beacon

▷ 5 beacons with a business need

▷ 1 long conn that's probably OK
  ○ demo1.aihhosted.com

▷ 1 long conn that can be safelisted
  ○ Windows Notification Service
  ○ Safelist the destination IP address

▷ That just leaves the first beacon

Another lab - Deep dive on beacon

▷ The IP 104.248.234.238 is suspect

▷ Let's deep dive on this connection

▷ What can we learn about this IP?

▷ Anything odd about the session?

▷ If you are running the VM:

  ○ Additional data in Zeek logs

  ○ Anything useful?

▷ Determine if comms are suspect or not

Hints

▷ User agent says Windows 7

▷ Is this consistent will all other conns?

▷ Perform a session size analysis

    ○ View 2 on beacon screen

    ○ Does this look like C2?

▷ What does Zeek show for a payload?

▷ Any other useful info?

Answers – session size analysis

Smallest session size but greatest number of connections. Could be C2 heartbeat.

Possible C2 activation

Sessions do have potential C2 attributes

Lab answers - suspect sessions

▷ Confirmed no FQDN query prior to connection
▷ This is highly suspect

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ cat dns.log | zeek-cut query answers | grep 104.248.234.238
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$
```

Answers - http analysis

Should be FQDN

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ cat http.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h host uri user_agent |
sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -3
   3011 192.168.99.51    104.248.234.238 104.248.234.238 /rmvk30g/eghmbblnphlaefbmmnoenohho
ncmcepapefjjekpleokhjfjmnmijghedkienplidbbcmgdjldbegpeemiboacnfcpnbnnhlmjbpcejfpecdioiddkl
fegefcjbcnagjclnoijpajlpkkegakmpdddojnlphegeehaacmofggdfkagpbighfkndllaamndepdanhnogedkaod
hgakiigoheminoolnaobdiiokpebghapnghbebkepiffooljden;1;4;1           Mozilla/4.0 (Windows 7 6.1
) Java/1.7.0_11
     17 192.168.99.51    72.21.81.240     11.tlu.dl.delivery.mp.microsoft.com         /filestrea
mingservice/files/b3317cef-3684-4c90-accc-aaf17f9a4670?P1=1591295507&P2=402&P3=2&P4=QaOTWB
xclTg7UNhQEI5DtHuLURn+MSdpYTdZFvlSYPL8oE8CLAGy3YGMYaaemNAoY6DhO87ccDabEFt29g5oXg==           Mi
crosoft-Delivery-Optimization/10.0
     13 192.168.99.51    8.252.133.254     3.tlu.dl.delivery.mp.microsoft.com          /filestrea
mingservice/files/62023f49-c795-4f2c-b1ad-691785434443?P1=1591295946&P2=402&P3=2&P4=NT59Yo
uPqG4KlXd/4KmhtlEQdz6EKxjsXlalRGmYkfJ/oAVAnmgIZx2TXpHocIv5Fj1Ghc2FXZZoPXeI8/8GXw==           Mi
crosoft-Delivery-Optimization/10.0
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ _
```

Usually Windows 10 but 7 in suspect connection

164

Answers - User agent analysis

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ cat http.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h user_agent | sort | un
iq | cut -f 3 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
     29 Microsoft-WNS/10.0
     16 Microsoft-Delivery-Optimization/10.0
      8 Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0
      1 WicaAgent
      1 Mozilla/4.0 (Windows 7 6.1) Java/1.7.0_11
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ _
```

Claims to be Windows 7 when speaking to this one IP
Claims to be Windows 10 for all other destination IP addresses

Answers - uri analysis

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ cat http.log | zeek-cut id.orig_h id.resp_h uri | grep 104.248.234
.238 | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
   3011 192.168.99.51   104.248.234.238 /rmvk30g/eghmbblnphlaefbmmnoenohhoncmcepapefjjekpl
eokhjfjmnmijghedkienplidbbcmgdjldbegpeemiboacnfcpnbnnhlmjbpcejfpecdioiddklfegefcjbcnagjcln
oijpajlpkkegakmpdddojnlphegeehaacmofggdfkagpbighfkndllaamndepdanhnogedkaodhgakiigoheminool
naobdiiokpebghapnghbebkepiffooljden;1;4;1
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ _
```

All 3,011 connection are this same really long string

Final answer

▷ Connections with 104.248.234.238 are highly suspect
  - No FQDN queries
  - 3,011 connections with strong beacon attributes
  - Shifting user agent string
  - No "host" field in HTTP header
  - Long convoluted URI string
  - Googling "rmvk30g" returns "Fiesta EK"

▷ All other entries can be safelisted

It's worth noting

▷ Capture contained 14,000+ connections

▷ Only one was "evil"

▷ We found it pretty quickly with ACH CE

Next lab!

▷ Let's move to the lab2 directory

▷ VM users will need to import the data

▷ After data import, select "lab2" database and hunt the data

▷ Use the last set of labs as a guide

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab1$ cd ../lab2
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab2$ rita import *.log lab2_
```

Hints

▷ May appear there is no results
▷ Check the top left of screen
▷ Pointing you to DNS module

Lab answers - C2 over DNS

▷ It looks like there is no data
▷ No individual IPs are listed
▷ Check top left of screen
▷ Indicates to check the DNS module
▷ C2 over DNS is presented differently
  ○ Source may be resolver, not infected client
  ○ Multiple src IPs if multiple resolvers are used
  ○ Results are consolidated for accuracy

Answers – C2 over DNS results


More unique resource records than reasonable

No users accessing resources

Answers - drill down on DNS

Change threshold from 1,000 to 0

Host name is Hex characters

Not usually a naming convention people use

Answers - Final

▷ Potential C2 over DNS
▷ Need to check source IP
  ○ Is it a client system?
  ○ Is it a DNS resolver?
  ○ True source must be identified
▷ Looks like dnscat2

Next set of labs!

▷ Let's move to the lab3 directory

▷ VM users will need to import the data

▷ After data import, select the "lab3" database and hunt the data

▷ Use the last set of labs as a guide

```
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab3$ cd ../lab2
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab2$ cd ../lab3
threat@ACH:~/labs/lab3$ rita import *.log lab3
```

Hints

▷ Repeat the process we've been using
▷ Where do you see high scores on the dashboard?
  ○ Investigate highest scores first
▷ Remember how we identified C2 beacons

Answers – Start with beacon web

That's not quite a Skype domain
Feel a bit scammy.

User agent is "Internet Explorer".
Not a valid user agent.

Answers – Skype like FQDN

Time histogram clearly shows a beacon

Answers – jitter

Connection dwell time is being jittered

The curve indicates Cobalt Strike

Answers – This is not good

newb02.skypetm.com.tw

6 / 88

? Community Score

⚠ **6 security vendors flagged this domain as malicious**

newb02.skypetm.com.tw
skypetm.com.tw

bot networks. advanced malware command and control   media sharing   dga

DETECTION   **DETAILS**   RELATIONS   COMMUNITY 1

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections.

Categories ⓘ

| Forcepoint ThreatSeeker | bot networks. advanced malware command and control |
| Xcitium Verdict Cloud | media sharing |

Last DNS records ⓘ

Record type	TTL	Value
A	299	23.253.126.58
A	299	104.239.157.210
TXT	299	v=spf1 -all

Answers - Let's move on

▷ We clearly have an HTTP beacon
  ○ Histogram is flat
  ○ User agent looks bogus
  ○ FQDN looks bogus
▷ We have enough data to trigger an incident response on our system
▷ Let's check for anything else

Answers – MS Office traffic

```
DST        self.events.data.microsoft.com
tls servers          52.114.158.53, ...
tls ports used       443
subjects             CN=*.events.dat...
invalid certificate  no
comm                 443:tcp:ssl
```

Can be safelisted if we use MS Office

Answers – OpenDNS

Two similar entries
DNS queries to OpenDNS

Do we use OpenDNS for DNS?
Have we purchased their security service?

If yes to the above, safelist.
If no to the above, investigate internal endpoint.

Answers - Long connections

Src	Src Network Name	Dst	Dst Network Name	Port:Protocol:Service	State	Total Bytes	Total Duration	
192.168.99.54	Unknown Private	167.71.97.235	Public	9200:tcp:-	closed	21.85 MB	23:59:49	▼
192.168.99.54	Unknown Private	52.177.165.30	Public	443:tcp:ssl, 443:tcp:-	closed	494.94 kB	19:49:02	▼

1 / 1

These are the same entries we had in the first lab.

May not appear if you safelisted them.

If you want to keep practicing

▷ Check our malware of the day blog

▷ Skip to the bottom, download the 24 hour long pcap file

▷ Process the pcap with Zeek
   ○ zeek -C -r <name of pcap> local

▷ Import into AC-Hunter

▷ When done, check the blog for answers
   ○ Did you miss anything?

https://www.activecountermeasures.com/?s=malware+of+the+day

Interested in a demo?

▷ Enterprise version has a lot more features

▷ Type "demo" in Zoom chat (not Discord) to learn more

   ○ Or email questions@activecountermeasures.com

▷ Huge refresh coming out over the next few months!

   ○ Were you here for the sneak peek?

Closing thoughts

▷ Remember the process
  ○ Identify connection persistency
  ○ Identify business need if present
  ○ Investigate external IP
  ○ Investigate internal IP
▷ Disposition each IP
  ○ Pretty certain it's still pristine
  ○ Pretty certain it's compromised
▷ Don't cross the passive/active line

Classes I'm teaching

▷ **Intro to Threat Hunting**
  ○ Basics of network threat hunting
  ○ Feb 23rd (next Friday)
  ○ https://www.activecountermeasures.com/hunt-training/

▷ **Advanced Threat Hunting**
  ○ Mostly labs hunting command and control channels
  ○ March 14th & 15th
  ○ https://www.antisyphontraining.com/advanced-network-threat-hunting-w-chris-brenton/

▷ **Intro to Packet Decoding**
  ○ IP headers from a security perspective
  ○ April 23rd - 26th
  ○ https://www.antisyphontraining.com/live-courses-catalog/getting-started-in-packet-decoding-chris-brenton/

▷ **Next run of this class Friday April 19th**

Thank you for attending!

▷ Thank you for sharing your valuable time with us today

▷ We hope the class has been helpful

▷ The team will monitor Discord for any last minute question

▷ If you are interested in talking about the enterprise version of AC-Hunter, just let us know :-)