

IP Transports

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ACTIVE COUNTERMEASURES,







Antisyphon Training

Lab requirements for this section


- Today is just lecture
- No lab setup needed

IP review

- In this section we'll cover some of the basics of IP communications
- Not complete coverage, just get us all on the same page
- If you want to deep dive, I have a class for that
 - Next class is May 5th!

https://www.antisyphontraining.com/course/getting-started-in-packet-decod ing-with-chris-brenton/


It's all about the binary



10.55.182.100.14291 > 10.233.233.5.80: Flags [S], cksum 0x9309 (correct), seq 2643678933, win 64240, options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 8,nop,nop,sackOK], length 0

0x0000:	4500 (0034	0a86	4000	7£06	3cb4	0a37	b664	E4@<7.d
0x0010:	0ae9 e	e905	37d3	0050	9d93	56d5	0000	0000	7PV
0x0020:	8002 f	faf0	9309	0000	0204	05b4	0103	0308	
0x0030:	0101 (0402							

Anatomy of a transmission



Decoders simply offset and measure based on RFC standards

Spoiler: It's all offset and measurement

- Last slide showed the order of headers
- This is defined by the RFCs
- RFCs also define fields in the headers
- Identifying an attribute is simply a matter of offsetting and measuring the right value

Identifying the transport protocol

- Offset to the beginning of the IP header
- Offset to byte 9 within the IP header
- Read the next 8 bits (1 byte) of data
- Compare value to assigned number list
- Print assigned protocol label
- IPv6 "next header" is byte 6 (but may not be the transport)

https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml

ICMP

- Protocol 1 (byte 9 of IP header)
- Maintenance protocol
- Not originally designed to transmit data
- System to system checks
- Handle network and some host errors
- Supports unicast, broadcast and multicast
- Lightweight & efficient but unreliable

ICMP and firewalls

- ICMP messages can be:
 - Query/response based like ping
 - Error reporting like Type 3 unreachables
- Query/response can be handled statefully
- Error reporting requires stateful inspection
 - Decode original packet stored in the payload
 - Match this original packet against the state table

ICMP error example

(07:37:07.730636 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 250, id 61550, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 96) 24.220.6.168 > 10.55.200.11: ICMP host 8.26.204.25 unreachable - admin prohibited filter, length 76 (IP (tos 0x0, ttl 121, id 11575, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 97) 10.55.200.11.56963 > 8.26.204.25.53: 5075 [lau][|domain]) 0x0000: 4500 0060 f06e 0000 fa01 de67 18dc 06a8 E..`.n....g... 0x0010: 0a37 c80b 030d 0ae8 0000 0000 4500 0061 .7....E..a 0x0020: 2d37 0000 7911 6ddf 0a37 c80b 081a cc19 -7..y.m.7.... 0x0030: de83 0035 004d 5214 13d3 0000 0001 0000 ...5.MR...... 0x0040: 0000 0001 0474 7366 650e 7472 6166 6669tsfe.traffi 0x0050: 6373 6861 7069 6e67 0364 7370 026d 7009) cshaping.dsp.mp.

In between red brackets is exposed ICMP header In between blue brackets is original UDP packet In between green brackets is 40 bytes of payload from original UDP packet

SI firewall should decode the blue section and compare it to state table

Can you hide data in ICMP?

student@packetdecode:~/lab2\$ tshark -r weird-ping.pcap -T fields -Y data.data -e "data.data" | xxd -r -p | head -20 dir dir Volume in drive C is OS Volume Serial Number is AA6E-E1EA Directory of c:\temp 05/27/2021 12:26 AM <DIR> 05/27/2021 12:26 AM <DTR> . . 10/15/2003 11:32 AM 25,122 about-nls.txt 07/21/2016 06:55 PM <DTR> all-hands 10/15/2003 11:32 AM 608 bugs.txt 02/26/2008 11:26 AM 23,574 build-h-bomb.txt 10/15/2003 11:33 AM 18,318 copying.txt 912 credits.txt 10/15/2003 11:33 AM 10/15/2003 01:44 PM 980,992 cygiconv-2.dll 08/11/2003 01:15 AM 37,888 cygintl-2.dll 08/11/2003 03:39 AM 134,656 cygjpeg-62.dll 185,344 cygmcrypt-4.dll 10/15/2003 01:45 PM 10/15/2003 01:45 PM 134,656 cygmhash-2.dll student@packetdecode:~/lab2\$

Some of the oldest C2 channels are based on ICMP

UDP

- Lightweight
- Connectionless (no concept of "state")
- Unreliable but can be built in at app layer
- Uses ICMP for error reporting
- Uses "ports" to support multiple services
- Supports unicast, broadcast and multicast

UDP comms can be unidirectional

04:21:42.061717	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	210
04:21:42.061839	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	207
04:21:42.061968	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	210
04:21:42.062084	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	237
04:21:42.062132						Description of the second state of the second state of the state of the state of the second state of th		
04:21:42.062177	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	211
04:21:42.062222	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	212
04:21:42.062266	ΙP	172.18.0.1.40395	>	172.18.0.2.514:	SYSLOG	user.notice,	length:	221

Lack of ICMP error and it's "assumed" packet was delivered and accepted

UDP comms can be bidirectional

15:48:42.685367 IP 10.0.2.15.55180 > 75.75.75.75.53: 15701+ A? config.teams.micro soft.com. (44) 15:48:42.700835 IP 75.75.75.75.75.53 > 10.0.2.15.55180: 15701 3/0/0 CNAME config.tea ms.trafficmanager.net., CNAME s-0005.s-msedge.net., A 52.113.194.132 (135) 15:49:42.819756 IP 10.0.2.15.62299 > 75.75.75.75.53: 38640+ A? ctldl.windowsupdat e.com. (41) 15:49:42.837319 IP 75.75.75.75.53 > 10.0.2.15.62299: 38640 5/0/0 CNAME audownload .windowsupdate.nsatc.net., CNAME au.download.windowsupdate.com.hwcdn.net., CNAME cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net., A 205.185.216.42, A 205.185.216.10 (198) 15:52:20.105650 IP 10.0.2.15.62865 > 75.75.75.75.53: 60440+ A? wpad.hsd1.fl.comca st.net. (42) 15:52:20.122593 IP 75.75.75.75.53 > 10.0.2.15.62865: 60440 NXDomain 0/1/0 (94)

UDP and firewalls

- Vulnerable to spoofing if static filters are used
 - Fix the source port at 53 and blast away
- Can be handled quite nicely with stateful filtering
 - Static filter handles first packet
 - Stateful handles replies
 - But not all services expect replies
- Usually no stateful inspection implementation
- State table timeout usually set around 30 seconds

TCP

- More overhead than UDP
- Built for reliability (to 1980 standards)
- Connection oriented ("state" is maintained)
- Has built in error reporting
- Has built in flow control
- Unicast communications only
- Like UDP, supports multiple services via ports

TCP Header

Offsets Octet Octet Bit	Octet	0									1										2								3						
	Bit	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	7	6	5	4	3	2 1	1			
0	0	Source port														Destination port																			
4	32	Sequence number																																	
8	64	Acknowledgment number (if ACK se														set)																			
12	96	Da	ata (offse	et		ser 00	ved 0	N S	C W R	ECE	U R G	A C K	P S H	R S T	S Y N	F I N	Window Size																	
16	128	Checksum															Urgent pointer (if URG set)																		
20	160																																		
:	:								Opti	ons (i	f data	offse	et > 5.	Padd	ed at	the e	nd wi	th "0	" b	ytes	if r	nec	ess	ary.)										
60	480																																		

TCP flags

- Used to control connection state
- Six low order bits of byte 13
- Used to identify connection establishment all the way through connection closing
- Designed to improve transmission reliability

Flag descriptions

- URG bit 32 Indicates that there is data to process in the urgent field of TCP header
- ACK bit 16 Indicates that there is data in the acknowledgement field. Should always be on after the first packet in a session
- PSH bit 8 Tell the destination to push data from the receipt buffer to the listening app

Flags (continued)

- RST bit 4 Indicate a closed port or that a current session has failed irrevocably
- SYN bit 2 Used to start a session. Set in the first packet sent by each host.
- FIN bit 1 Used to gracefully close a session. Sent once by each end of the connection.

TCP and static firewalls

- Pattern match on TCP flags to enumerate state
- SYN=1 interpreted as connection establishment
- SYN=0 interpreted as established state
- Static filter vulnerable to packet crafting
 - SYN=1 & FIN=1
 - Unsolicited ACK=1

TCP and stateful firewalls

- Like with UDP, dramatic security improvement
- Static filters used to screen first packet in session
- State table used to screen everything else
- Not as susceptible to packet crafting
 - SYN/FIN not passed unless there is a rule to permit connection establishment
 - Not fooled like static filters

TCP and stateful inspection firewalls

- Used with FTP to see data negotiation over command channel
- Not needed by other protocols
- Can be used to inspect the payloads
 - But it is usually simple RegEx pattern matching
 - Not as advanced as proxies or monitoring tools

QUIC

- Built on top of UDP, but effectively a transport
- Assumes HTTP and TLS on all connections
- Improved congestion control and multiplexing
- Error correct when supporting multiple flows
 - Remove head of line problems with TCP
- Connection migration between networks
- Uses UDP port 443

Why do we need QUIC?

- Most Internet traffic is TCP-HTTP-TLS based
 - Handshaking for each creates overhead
 - QUIC designed to replace these connections
- QUIC focused on optimizing this configuration
 - Reduce the overhead involved
 - No TCP three packet handshake
 - Credential and privacy info can be cached
 - Optimize content delivery and data recovery

QUIC is still a work in progress

- QUIC is still changing
 - Updates a recent at Oct 2024
 - RTP support, multipath extensions, event definitions, etc.
- Originally developed by Google
 - Has since gained wider support
- Slowly adopted for streaming content
 - Video & audio
 - Mobile apps

QUIC and firewalls

- Limitations are similar to UDP
 - Traffic controlled at the port and IP level
- Arguably less control as you can't manipulate streams
 - Can't limit to internal hosts only
 - Can't specify key or cryptology levels
 - Basically, you are flying kind of blind

QUIC and security

- Privacy improvements
 - Essentially a tunnel protocol
 - No useful plaintext data
 - No one can see what you are doing
- Major blow to corporate security
 - Blue team cannot see what systems are doing
 - Could be normal or malicious, can't tell
 - Many sites are choosing to disable support

Next week on Fireside Fridays!

- Packet filtering firewalls
- Both packet filtering and proxies
- Next week is just lecture
- The week after is hands on testing

Wrap up

- Thank you for attending!
- Certs & videos should be out by Monday
- If you have any lingering questions, the Discord channel will remain active
 - Also a good chance to socialize with others in the class
 - Have other tips and tricks? Please share with others :-)
- We appreciate you sharing your time with us!